The goal of the paper is to set forth general guidelines that we believe would enhance the usefulness of future social experiments and to suggest ways of correcting for inherent limitations of them. Although the major motivation for an experiment is to overcome the inherent limitations of structural econometric models, in many instances the experimental designs have subverted this motivation. The primary advantages of randomized controlled experiments were often lost. The major complication for the analysis of the experiments was induced by an endogenous sample selection and treatment assignment procedure that selected the experimental participants and assigned them to control versus treatment groups partly on the basis of the variable whose response the experiments were intended to measure. We propose that to overcome these difficulties, the goal of an experimental design should be as nearly as possible to allow analysis based on a simple analysis of variance model. Although complexities attendant to endogenous stratification can be avoided, there are inherent limitations of the experiments that cannot. Two major ones are self-determination of participation and self-selection out, through attrition. But these problems, we believe, can be corrected for with relative ease if endogenous stratification is eliminated. Finally, we propose that as a guiding principle, the experiments should have as a first priority the precise estimation of a single or a small number of treatment effects. Primary examples include a series of income maintenance experiments, a housing allowance demand experiment, several electricity pricing experiments, and a health insurance experiment. luch of our discussion in this paper is motivated by the income maintenance experiments but it also draws from our experience with the housinq allowance and electricity experiments as well.
nent shciud Dc desicned tc oviate. section I prDvice a mc exp1afl-tion of tins goal and is intended to motivate tne remainder of trie paper.
The major compUction for the analysis of the experiments was induced by an endooenous sample selection and treatment assignment procedure that selected the experimental participants and assigned them to control versus treatment roups partly on the basis of an outcome variable the chanqe in which1 the exneriments were intended to measure. To overcome at the time of analysis of the exoerinental results the complications caused by the endogenous sample selection and treatment assignment required rather complex statistical techniques and detracted creatly from the simplicity we believe should be a coal of experimental desiens.
We propose that to overcome these difficulties, an experimental design should as nearly as possible allow analysis based on a simple analysis of variance model. This would mean that sample selection and treatment assignment should be based on randomization and that stratification on response variables should be avoided.
Aithouqh complexities attendant to endogenous stratification can be avoided, there are inherent limitations of the experiments that cannot. Two rna.ior ones are self-determination of participation and self-selection outs through attrition. But these problems, we believe, can be corrected for with relative ease if endogenous stratification is eliminated.
Finally, we propose that as a guiding principle, the experiments should have as a first priority the precise estimation of a single or a small number of treatment effects. The experiments to date have in general been hampered by a large number of treatments together with small sample sizes so that no sirigIe trCtrient COJ1 te eiec dccurateiy.
Foliowirc tne rti'tion in Section 1, we have elaborated in Section Ii these several ceneral auidelnes that we believe would enhance the effectiveness of future exDerirents. The problem of endooenous stratification and a way of avoidinc it are set forth in Section 111. A method of correcting for the inherent self-selection problems of social experiments is suggested in Section 1V.
Unbiased Estimates, Structural Models, and Randomization
To obtain unbiased estimates is the major motivation for a large The guiding principle for econometricians is that simple estimation techniques (e.g., least squares) will yield unbiased estimates of if X is uncorrelated with c. Unbiased is understood to mean arid is indeed defined to rnan an unbiased estirate of the 'causal' effect of X on , the understood definition of in much, but not all, of econoietric analysis.
But although the principle is demonstrably true in theory, it is often difficult to approximate in practice and its existence impossible to verify without reservation. Nonetheless, the aoal remains.
To move toward it, econometricians use two ceneral modes of reasoning.
One is economic theory that restricts the functional form of f, although usually only within broad bounds. The other is statistical theory, that in large part prescribes methods to correct for correlation between X and ., and thus to obtain unbiased estimates of . The combination of economic and statistical theory often leads--at least in the abstract--to specification and estimation of structural models. Structural models can be thought of as those in which the parameters have a causal interpretation, and with the concomitant property that if unbiased estimates of them are obtained they also could be given a causal interpretation.
But although theoretical prescription of models and their empirical estimation can restrict the form of f, they can do so only within limits.
The estimates must be interpreted within the constraints implicit in the assumptions that underlie them. In particular, it is usually not possible to know for sure that X is uncorrelated with c, or if not, that corrections have been made for correlations that exist.
4 response to this dilemma is to choose selected values of X in such a way that they are by design uncorrelated with other determinants of Y, and thus allowing unbiased estimation of the corresponding values of B.
The technique is randomization and it is most often employed within the -5-of a ranDomized con:rollea experiment. For urposez of eXpD5-tion, we shall hencefortn use as an example estimation of the effects of income maintenance plans--taxes arid cuarantees--on earninqs.
Suppose that the plan is I, called the treatment, and that earnings depend on T, other measured variables X, and on unmeasured determinants c according to
If individuals (more often families) are chosen at random from the population and on values of T, in large samples I will be uncorrelated with c and with X as well. Then simple least squares analysis of variance estimation of the model
where r is equal to f and treated as a disturbance term in this model, will yield unbiased estimates of 6.
The primary motivation for this approach is to circumvent the uncertainties inherent in the assumptions of structural econometric models, by constructing T in such a way that it is uncorrelated with other determinants of Y and thus by construction assurinq unbiased estimation of E1.
We have set forth these possibly oversimplified ideas to serve as background and motivation for our subsequent discussion. In particular,
it is important to keep in mind the motivation for randomized controlled experiments. Although in the large social experiments, we believe it is impossible to create the theoretical paradigm of such an experiment, we believe that the paradigm should serve as a guide to their designs as Ii.
General Goals and Guiding Propositions
With the powerful advantage of hindsight, and we hope aided by our part in the analysis of social experiments to date, we shall set forth several propositions that we believe will enhance the value of future experiments. To do this, we will explain what we believe to be the major inherent limitations of such experiments. The primary ones are self-determination of experimental participation and self-determination of withdrawal from the experiment. These we believe can be corrected for, and some suggestions for doing so are contained in the following sections. There are other design characteristics of the experiments to date that we believe unnecessarily complicated their analysis, and in particular made it much more difficult to correct for the inherent limitations of them. The primary design feature of this type is stratification on endogenous variables. We will address this question first, then turn onetheiess, it has been difficult to obtain funds for experimental programs that ouaranteed support for higher income families, even though under most plans payments to this group would be small, since their earnints would be unlikely to fall below the "breakeven' point at which payments are zero. In addition, if it is important to obtain a 'good' estimate of the effect of the proqrarn on low income families, then it is necessary to have a large enough number of low income families to do so.
Of course a large random sample from the population would also provide a large number of low income families. But larger sample sizes of course increase the cost of the experiment.
We do not present numbers on the marginal cost of an additional experimental family. Preliminary investigation, however, suggests that it is small relative to the fixed costs of running an experiment. Suppose that for whatever reason, it is not feasible to select a random sample from the population. We propose in this case that the sample be as random as possible. That is, randomly select persons with incomes below a given level, without endogenous stratification within this group. But what should be the measure of income that determines eligibility?
We have proposed in.Section 111--after a more detailed description of the endogenous stratification problem--a method for selecting the experimental group, based on predicted income, in such a way that the stratification is not endogenous. One is that persons cannot in general be made to participate in an experiment if selected by a random procedure. Some of those randomly selected will participate while others will not. If the individual participation decision is related to the effect that the treatment would have on individuals, then the estimated treatment effect will be a biased estimate of the effect to be expected if the treatment were instituted as a program applying to the entire population.
The 1954 Salk vaccine experiment provides a good example of this effect. There were two primary versions of the experimental design. In the "placebo control" areas, children who agreed to be inoculated (or, more accurately, whose parents agreed to the inoculation) were randomly assigned to the vaccine group or to the placebo group. In the "observed control" area, second grade children who agreed to inoculation received the vaccine, while first and third graders served as the control group.
Selected results arechown in table 1.
Chilaren in tne clacebo control areas wno were not inoculated contracted polio at a rate of 54 per 100,000. Tne comparable ficure for children who participated in the experiment was 81, the rate for those who participated and received the placebo. Similarly in the observed control areas, grade 2 children who were not inoculated had a substantially lower rate: (53), than the rate for the control group (61). Thus apparently children who were more likely to contract polio and thus more likely to be helped by the vaccine, were more likely to participate in the experi- A similar effect was apparent in the recent housing allowance demand experiment. Because of the nature of the primary experimental allowance, many families could benefit under the allowance plan only if they were willing to move. It seems apparent from subsequent analysis that of low income renters who were asked to participate in the experiment, those who were less adverse to moving were more likely to participate in the experiment. (See Venti and Wise [1982] .) Thus the estimated experimental effect tended to exaggerate the increase in rent that would be induced by the allowance were it applied to all low income renters.
-12-e have suooested in or a procedure trat we bell eve could be used to correct for this rotertial bias, assuminc that the self-selection cannot be avoided.
The other form of self-selection is attrition from the experimental sample, once a sample has been selected. Again, the problem is that determinants of dropping out rav be related to the experimental response that would otherwise be observed. For example, persons who are not affected by the treatment, possibly because they have high incomes for example, may be more likely to drop out than those who are affected and thus receive higher payments. This is the problem addressed by Hausman and Wise fl979].
If the experimental design is not complicated by endogenous stratification and assignment, then correction for self-determination of participation and attrition would be relatively simple. Indeed correction for both simultaneously is quite feasible and this is the approach taken in Section IV. Such a correction, however, is much more complicated if the experimental design is also complicated by endogenous stratification and assignment. This reinforces the proposal that such stratification be avoided in favor of random sampling. Then analysis of experimental results can address complications that are unavoidable without having to devote extraordinary effort to correct for complications induced by the experimental design.
-13-C.
-dc:iora1 Corcern b characteristic of experiments to date has been a rather larQe number of treatments. The income maintenance experiments, for example, entailed several treatments defined by different combinations of income ouarantee levels and tax rates. In none of the experiments, ho.ever, were tne sample sizes large enough to obtain precise estimates of the effects of any particular treatment. Thus analysts aenerally resorted to estimation of a single effect that did not distinguish the various treatments, or they assumed a structural model that allowed interpolation across individuals assigned to different treatments. The more the latter procedure was followed, the less consistent the analysis was with the motivation for an experiment. That is, it subverted the major goal of using random selection and treatment assignment to circumvent the inherent limitations of hypothesized structural models.
Thus it seems to us that priorities should be ordered in such a way that the primary goals of an experiment are met first. The first goal we propose should be the estimation of an experimental effect for a treatment. Then additional treatments should be added only if each additional one can also be estimated with precision. The proposition is that precise estimation of the effect of single treatment or the effects of a few treatments is to be preferred to imprecise estimates of many.
This we propose should be done in such a way that simple analysis of covariance estimates of treatment effects may be obtained, subject to the limitations on randomization discussed above and detailed more fully below. Thus we would propose an evaluation model of the form it would be likely also to reduce the effect of self-determination of participation.
The reader will note the absence of a structural parameterization that attempts, for example, to describe income and substitution effects.
This is because we believe that simple precise estimates of a few effects will be more readily understood by most observers and will thus carry more weight in the decision-making process. In addition, if for policy purposes, it is desirable to estimate the effects of possible programs not described by treatments, then interpolations can be made between estimated treatment effects. If the experimental treatments are at the bounds of possible programs, then of course this is easier. Although it can be argued that structural models are necessary to make interpolations, we believe that for almost any situation we can think of, the simplicity of say linear interpolations far outweigh the possible advantages of interpolations based on a structural model. At the same time, it maintains the spirit of an experiment.
If the experiment is to inform the policy making process, we believe that a single number that can be supported can be more confidently relied on than more complex analysis. That the labor supply effect of a known treatment is 16 percent and not 2 percent, for example, is we believe much This is not to say that experimental data should not be used to estimate structural econometric models. These data can of course be used like other survey data for this purpose. But the experiment should be thought of in the first instance as a way to obtain accurate estimates of the effects of particular proarams. Structural models with parameters estimated on survey data could also be used to make such estimates. (Presumably this would be done to a considerable extent before an experiment were undertaken, if for no other reason than simply to help to inform the choice of experimental treatment or treatments.) in this sense, the experiment could be thought of as checking the accuracy of predictions based on analysis of survey data. That is, the experiments should be designed to provide a selected number of points "on' the response surface, defined for example by tax rate and guarantee levels. it is rather straightforward to check for example the degree to which alternative structural models fit these "known' points on the response surface. In short, an experiment should be used to avoid the inherent limitations of structural models in providing accurate estimates of the effects of specified programs. Their major advantage should not be lost sight of in an effort to estimate models that will predict the result of any plan. A lack of confidence in such estimates is the motivation for the experiments. To use the experimental data only to provide more such estimates, or to set up the experiments in such a way that only such estimates are possible, is to travel to Rome to buy canned peas. We shall now consider three experimental designs in which endogenous sampling was used.
(i) In the New Jersey Negative Income Tax experiment any individual whose pre-experimental income exceeded 1.5 times the government set poverty limit was excluded from the sample. This sample truncation was used because the major effect of an NIT program was expected to be on low income individuals and families. A simple rule was thus used to make the sample resemble the target population. Suppose a model like equation (5) is used to analyze the effects on hours worked. Suppose also that individuals' earnings are low in period one either because they have low p or because is negative even though p is positive. Low p people with positive n1 have been excluded from the sample. The analyst must maintain the assumption that the effect on hours worked for the sample combination of low p and high p people (with negative n) will represent the total population response. This assumption appears unlikely to hold true because we might well expect the behavioral response to differ among the low p and high p people. In other words, if we were to chanqe the sample truncation point from 1.5 times the poverty limit to another level, the tmted eYOCriiTntai eect 'ld Dc likcy to crar:oe as we.
(ii) in the Connecticut ime of Day Eiectricity Demonstration (1977), the sacle was 9roued into quirtiies on the basis of electricity usaoe in the year prior to the demonstration. Then households in the upper quintiles were disproportionately sampled since the electric utility correctly thought that their reaction to the introduction of time of day electricity rates would have the laroest effects on system revenues.
(iii) In the Seattle-Denver Income iainteriance Experiment, (SITIE-DIME), . We solve equation (7) to find
The optimal design thus increases the probability of inclusion in the sample for low c individuals. But since c is a function of pre-experimental income we see that E(uJX.) 0 which will lead to bias in the estimation of experimental effects.
We do not want to give the erroneous impression that endogenous sampling destroys the possibility of experimental analysis. In fact,
we have written several papers addressing the problem, Hausman-Wise To illustrate the nature of these assumptions, we consider acain the three eamples and for each we discuss possible model specifications.
(1) Sample truncation: In Hausman and Wise [1976, 1977] , models to correct for sample truncation are developed. The approach taken assumes that the earnings conditional on personal attributes are distributed lognormal. A two period model is necessary since sample truncation was performed on the pre-experinental data. But since the correlation of the disturbances across years ( in equation (5)) is not zero, truncation on pre-experimental data will affect the analysis of the experimental results.
Therefore, we define a model of the form leads to a liLelihood function that is considerably more complicated than equation (10). (See Hausman and Wise (1976, p.432) .) Furthermore, given the identity between earnings and the product of waoes and hours, we must now (2) Stratification on the endocenous variables: To keep the analysis simple we here assume that income has been grouped into two intervals, even though in the Gary NIT experiment as well as the Connecticut TOD demonstration quintiles were used. Assume that below some level L an unknown proportion of a random sample of the population is sampled, P1, and above L, a proportion P2.6 Then the density function is
wnere f is tne normal density function N(Z, 02). Only the ratio P = P2/P1 can be identified. Therefore, we divide through tne expressions in equation (11) by P1. Again using the normality assumption for y and assuming N1 persons with y < L and N2 with y > 1 the log likelihood function is
E in P + E in f(y) -
Aaain, a maintained distributional assumption is necessary and a rather complicated maximum likelihood problem is presented.
Furthermore, when we want to do a two period analysis or consider other problems, our ability to do so is limited by the rapidly increasing complications induced by the stratification on the endogenous variable.
(3) Treatment assignment usinq an endogenous variable: Our last example is the SIME-DIME NIT experimental design. Here seven income inervas, celled "E-ive,' ere ud to define ro's in the Conlisk-tt cr1 fr0 or: of ecuati ons (6) rise with E-level because it was assumed that tax revenues would decline and that NIT payments would increase. The result was that no one in the hinhest E-level interval was assioned treatment status; all were assioned to be controls where, of course, the cost does not grow with E-level.
Furthermore, in general persons with higher E-levels were more likely to be assigned to experimental treatments with more generous supoort levels.
Thus, treatment assignment was based on an endoaenous variable, preexperimental income, which was highly correlated with the response variable during the experiment.
Treatment assignment using endogenous variables does not in theory prevent the use of ANOVA in the analysis phase of an experiment. What is needed, however, is an elaborate specification allowing a separate in equation (5) for each E-level and treatment or control assignment. But, in the SIME-DIME experiment for example, including manpower treatments, there would be J = 59 columns in the X matrix. In fact, if full ANOVA were done without deleting higher order interactions as did the design model, we would have J exceedino 200. Thus, even for the comparatively large sample sizes as in the SIME-DIME we cannot hope to obtain precise estimates of experimental effects. And when other factors such as race and city are added to the analysis, full ANOVA specifications with many fewer parameters than the experimental design requires. One approach is to enter E-level as a righthand side variable in linear form. But we immediately lose the model free aspect of ANOVA since correctness of functional form becomes an issue. Figure 1 represents the density of commas with a truncation point T.9 Suppose our aim is to sample poople in the area of the distribution marked I. Now instead of using pre-experimental income with its associated problems, consider the use of "exogenous' income stratification, based on income predicted on the basis of exogenous variables, say from the regression equation (13) z. + . The form of the solution can be seen by assuming that the variable has been transformed to make the residuals approximately normal and that we center the data to set y = 0. Then we choose k to
where a is the standard deviation of the residual distribution. The first order conditions of equation (16) are straightforward and the problem can be solved straightforwardly on a computer since the constraint will be satisfied with eoualitv and all the functions are morDtOniC in k. in this problem the gains over random sampling increase as the variance of the residuals decrease so that y and y are more hiohly correlated as we would expect. if the correlatIon becomes very small, we will be quite close to random samplinc. But in many cases random samplinc may be ref&rable to endooenous sampling, which as we have attempted to show, can le to difficult problems ir the analysis phase of an experiment.
IV.
Self-Determination of Participation and Attrition
We have addressed in the previous sections a problem that we believe has been largely induced by experimental design and that we believe should be avoided. In this section we will address a major potential problem that we believe cannot in general be avoided but that can be corrected for withDut undue complication as •long as it is not accompanied by induced endogenous stratification.
Suppose that it were possible to select a random sample of families from the population, or from a subset of the population (say with predicted income below some level). Of the families selected at random, some,when asked to participate in the experiment,will do so while others will elect not to participate. Even though a random sample is identified, those who choose to participate may not represent a random sample. In experiments to date there has been no systematic record kept of who when asked participates and who does not. Thus it has not been possible to identify systematic differences (and in particular unmeasured ones) between those who participate and those who do not, and, of course, if there were differences, there has been no way to correct for them. In the income maintenance --exerns, for exanpE, a rcceure like the foliov.ing was used. Each experiment .as conducted :ithin a single city or a small number of cities.
4ll families within the city, or within some section of the city were canvassed to locate those with a few predetermined characteristics, in these experiments, income, race, age of family head, and number of dependents were attributes that determined eligibility. Those who were found to meet the eligibility criteria were asked to enroll in the experiment. Of those who did enroll, some were assigned to a treatment group, and others to a control group. It is the enrollment decision that concerns us here.
Suppose that instead of using a procedure like the above, we were to begin with an external source of data on families. where T is an indicator variable with the value 1 for experimentals and zero for controls.
-31-Eut suppose that rot all of the random sample agrees to participate.
Suppose that participation depends on X and a random disturbance term r in the following way: where MT is the correlation between Fl and T. If the treatment indicator T, however, is assigned randomly, then it will be uncorrelated with X and thus with Fl which is a function of X. Thus under these simple assumptions, the least squares estimate of the treatment effect will be consistent, as long as the assignment to control versus treatment groups is random. Each participant could be randomly assigned or each of those in the Census sample could be randomly ass ed prior to enrolimer:, as lono as at the time of enrollment, prospective participants did riot know their assignment.
But the model as set out above hides by omission a potential major source of self selection bias. Suppose that if the treatment were given to all persons in the population, the responses would vary amonQ them.
It is clear that this is indeed the case (ever after controlling for measured family characteristics). It seems plausible that the decision to participate will deoend on the potential response. For example, it is often hypothesized that persons whose behavior is most likely to be affected will be most likely to participate, even thouah they do pot know prior to enrollment whether they will be in the treatment or in the control group. This is the essence of the examples given in Section Il-B.
The idea may be represented by a random effects model of the form Using (2i), the expected value of Y among participants is aiven y,
E(YIP > 0)
In this case, it is clear that the last term will be correlated with and a least squares estimate of would be biased.
Joint, maximum likelihood estimation of (18) and (21), however, could be used to obtain a consistent estimate of . The procedure is similar to the one proposed by Hausman and Wise [1979] , except that the equations -3-pertain to tne response variab'e and participation, rather than to the response variable and attrition. In this case, there are two possible outcones: Individual i doesn't participate with probability. To take advantage of individual specific characteristics that persist 
